Customary law jurisprudence from Kenyan courts: implications for traditional justice systems by Kariuki,  Francis  Kamau
1 
 
Customary Law Jurisprudence from Kenyan Courts: Implications 
for Traditional Justice Systems 
Francis Kariuki* 
Abstract 
For a long time, the jurisprudence emanating from Kenyan courts has treated African 
customary law as an inferior source of law in comparison to formal laws. Consequently, 
certain customary practices and traditions that can foster social justice and peaceful 
coexistence amongst communities such as traditional justice systems had not been 
formally recognized in law. However, the 2010 Constitution recognizes customary law 
and the use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in resolving disputes. It also 
protects the culture and other cultural expressions of the people. This recognition is 
important because of the close interlink between traditional justice systems and 
customary law. In this paper, an examination of previous court decisions dealing with 
customary law is attempted to glean courts approach to customary law in the past and 
whether it can influence the application of traditional justice systems in enhancing access 
to justice.  The paper posits that the way courts have interpreted customary law since the 
advent of colonialism may be a barrier to the application of traditional justice systems. A 
need therefore arises for courts to develop a jurisprudence that is supportive of 
customary law and traditional justice systems. A change of mindset and perceptions 
amongst judges, lawyers and the wider citizenry towards customary law is required if 
traditional justice systems are to contribute to enhanced access to justice for communities 
in Kenya.  
1.0 Introduction 
In Kenya, like in most other former African colonies, the legal system is pluralistic. The 
sources of law include the Constitutions, statutes, received laws, religious laws and customary 
laws.
1
 Prior to colonialism, indigenous African tribes applied their laws and customs in resolving 
conflicts and disputes, and this contributed to social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. Because 
African customary law developed out of the customs and practices of the people in response to 
their circumstances and challenges in life, it essentially differs from one ethnic community to the 
other. The term „African customary law‟ does not therefore infer that there exists a single custom 
followed by all African communities.
2
 
With colonialism, formalized dispute resolution systems such as courts and tribunals 
were introduced in Kenya. As a result, the challenges of applicable law in a certain matter and 
the hierarchy of laws arose especially when dealing with Africans. The initial approach was to 
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apply customary law on personal matters while there was confusion on criminal matters since in 
some cases both written law and African customs were applied. The general rule in most cases 
was that written and received law, in Kenya‟s case common law, doctrines of equity and statutes 
of general application, ranked higher than African Customary law. Colonialists regarded African 
customary law as inferior to written laws and therefore had to place limitations on its 
application.
3
 Furthermore, after independence, statutes such the Judicature Act
4
 and the 
Magistrate Courts Act
5
 were enacted setting out the hierarchy of the laws and the purview of 
African customary law. These laws guided the courts when determining customary law claims 
until 2010 when the Constitution of Kenya 2010 was promulgated providing for wider avenues 
for the application of customary law. This paper discusses how Kenyan courts have interpreted 
customary law, the emerging jurisprudence and the jurisprudence that we expect from our courts 
in relation to the enhanced role and profile of customary law vis-à-vis traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 
The paper has seven parts.  Part I is the introduction. Part II provides a brief overview of 
the court system since colonialism with a bias to African customary laws and formal courts. Part 
III highlights the dichotomy in jurisprudence between the formal and informal courts from 
colonialism up to independence. Part IV highlights the courts jurisprudence on African 
customary law from 1967 to 2010. Part V highlights the emerging jurisprudence after the 
promulgation of the 2010 Constitution. Part VI projects the direction jurisprudence on African 
customary law may take in the future taking into account new laws, past and emerging 
jurisprudence. Part VII concludes that despite the fact that emerging jurisprudence from our 
courts is supportive of customary law, past judicial decisions and judicial attitude may continue 
to influence courts thinking on customary law and therefore impede the application of traditional 
justice systems. 
 
2.0 An Overview of the Judicial System since Colonialism 
Initially, the court system was pluralistic and depended on the race of the different 
inhabitants of Kenya then. Firstly, Article 52 of the 1897 Order-In-Council stated that African 
customary law applied to Africans provided it was not repugnant to justice and morality. Article 
2(b) of the Native Courts Regulations Ordinance, 1897, recognized the use of existing dispute 
resolution systems, which at the time consisted of local chiefs and councils of elders. The local 
chiefs and councils of elders applied customary law in deciding disputes relating to their 
subjects. Secondly, Article 57 of the Native Courts Regulation Ordinance applied Islamic laws to 
Muslims. Muslim law was applied by Mudirs and from 1907 the Liwali courts. The Indians and 
Europeans were subject to statutes, common law and the courts.
6
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In 1930, the colonial administration revised the court system relating to indigenous 
Africans with the lowest courts being a panel of elders from native law or area and whose 
decisions were appealed at the Native Appeals Tribunal, the District Commissioner and lastly to 
the Provincial Commissioner.
7
 In 1951, the African Court replaced the Tribunal and the judicial 
powers of the Provincial Commissioner were transferred to the newly established Courts of 
Review.
8
 In 1962, lay magistrates replaced the African Courts. In 1967, the Magistrates Courts 
Act
9
 gave District Magistrates power to hear claims under African customary law. District 
Magistrates had jurisdiction all over Kenya and they effectively eliminated all African Courts. 
Appeals from the District Magistrate Courts went to First Class Magistrates, the High Court and 
then the East African Court of Appeal, which was replaced by the Court of Appeal after the 
collapse of the East African Community. According to Section 3(2) of the Judicature Act,
10
 
African customary law was to guide the Court of Appeal, the High Court and all subordinate 
courts in civil matters. In addition, the courts could only apply customary law if it was not 
repugnant to justice and morality. The use of customary law in courts was therefore meant to 
ensure there was substantive justice as encapsulated in section 3(2) of the Judicature Act.  
 Article 162 of the 2010 Constitution establishes a two-tier court system: Superior courts 
and subordinate courts. The Superior courts include the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the 
High Court, Environment and Land Court, and Industrial Court. Subordinate courts include 
magistrate courts, Kadhi courts, and court martial. Article 159 (2)(c) and (3) entreats court to be 
guided by principles of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms provided  the principles do not 
contradict the Bill of Rights, the Constitution, other written laws or result in outcomes that are 
repugnant to justice and morality. 
 
3.0 Application of African Customary Law by Kenyan Courts from Colonial era up to 
1967 
Since the British adopted existing legal systems, formal or informal, the law applied by 
the council of elders and the chiefs was the African customary law. Consequently, there was a 
dichotomy of courts. Informal institutions such as the council of elders, native tribunals and later 
African courts primarily resolved disputes among Africans. Disputes among Europeans were 
resolved in the formal courts, especially the supreme courts and it is only in limited instances 
when Africans were tried at the formal courts.
11
 
On the one hand, the council of elders, African native tribunals, and later the African 
Courts applied customary laws. The jurisprudence from these tribunals, councils and courts show 
that they treated customary law with due regard as they applied the customs in both civil and 
criminal matters. Firstly, these courts applied to a distinct group of crimes, customary crimes and 
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wrongs, to their respective ethnic groups. For instance, among the Luo, it was a customary crime 
to abuse another or to take a woman from his marital home. For example, in Maseno African 
Court Criminal Case 454 of 1966, the plaintiff was able to sue the accused for wrongfully taking 
away a woman from her husband‟s custody without permission contrary to Luo customs. 
Similarly, in Augustino v. Isabella w/o Onyango & Atieno w/o of Onyango,
12
 the plaintiff sued 
the defendants for defamation under the Luo customs.   
Secondly, these courts, councils and tribunals could punish for offences under statutes 
using African customary laws. In Kosele African Court Criminal Case no 33 of 1966, the 
accused was charged with indecent assault contrary to Section 144 of the Penal Code. The Court 
found that he was guilty for breaking the virginity of his victim. Instead of imprisoning him, the 
Court fined him a customary compensation of a heifer.  Similarly, in Bungoma District African 
Court Criminal Case No. 493 of 1967, the accused was charged with common assault contrary to 
section 250 of the then Penal Code. The court found him guilty and imposed a customary fine of 
a sheep. Although section 176 of the current Penal Code provides for compensation, no method 
for determining the amount exists and this may explain why courts imposed customary 
compensation. 
Lastly, formal courts appreciated the role of these councils, courts and tribunals in 
resolution of disputes of personal nature. In civil and personal matters, customary laws applied to 
Africans irrespective of the fact that some had become Christians and rejected African customs. 
For example, in Benjawa Jembe v. Priscilla Nyondo,
13
 Barth J held that African Customary law 
was applicable to the estate of an African who had abandoned the customs and became a 
Christian. 
On the other hand, formal courts in general and European judges in particular, treated 
African customary law and traditional dispute resolution systems as inferior to other laws.  In 
1917, just 5 years after the Jembe case, Hamilton C.J. was faced with the question of the 
recognition of customary marriages in R v, Amkeyo.
14
 In this case, the question that arose during 
trial was whether a woman married under African customary law could testify against her 
husband. The common law deemed a husband and wife as one person and neither could be 
compelled to give evidence against the other. According to Hamilton C. J., a wife married under 
African customary law was not a legal wife or spouse. Consequently, the court compelled her to 
give evidence against her husband. This decision highlights the inferiority of African customary 
law in comparison to the Ordinances and common law that were in force at the time. From this 
decision, one cannot see a sound basis as to why a common law wife was regarded as a legal 
wife, while a customary law wife could not get a similar status. Why was there indifference 
towards African customary law considering that even common law was the English customary 
law? 
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Moreover, European judges and formal courts treated African courts, tribunals and 
council of elders with opprobrium. In Lolkilite ole Ndinoni v. Netwala ole Nebele
15
 the East 
African Court of Appeal dealt with two matters relating to the Maasai customary practice of 
blood money and the ability of Native Tribunals to apply the Limitation Ordinance of 1934. The 
appellant‟s father, who was deceased at the time of the case, had allegedly committed homicide 
and the matter was taken to the Native Tribunal. However, the claim for blood money was made 
at the native tribunal thirty-five years after the alleged homicide. The Tribunal dismissed the suit 
but the Supreme Court awarded the claim. The Appellant appealed to the East African Court of 
Appeal. The East African Court of appeal dismissed the claim on the ground that it was 
repugnant to justice and morality to bring a matter for hearing after 35 years. It is clear that the 
East African Court of Appeal considered claims for blood money valid but rejected bringing the 
matter after a long period. Despite the ruling that indirectly supported the claim for blood money, 
Sir Edward C.J. (Uganda) held that the Native Tribunals were not courts in the proper sense and 
therefore the Limitation Ordinance of 1934 was not applicable to them. The finding that the 
Native Tribunals were not proper courts, illustrates the Europeans attitude towards customary 
dispute resolution methods as inferior to formal courts. 
 
4.0 Court Application of Customary Laws from 1967 to 2010 
After independence, the legal system in Kenya changed. The 1967 Magistrate Courts Act 
converted the informal African Courts that heard matters relating to customary laws into formal 
Magistrate courts. Section 2 of the Act limited the customary claims under the law to matters of 
land, intestacy, family, seduction of unmarried women and girls, enticement of married women 
to adultery and status of women and children.  This shift came through the 1963 Constitution that 
abolished unwritten customary crimes.
16
 Likewise, section 3(2) of the Judicature Act limits the 
application of customary law by stating that it is only to guide courts in civil cases.  
 
4.1 Application of Customs to Civil and Personal Matters 
After 1967 courts reinforced the formal colonial courts perspective that customary law 
was inferior to other legal norms. Courts were only applying customary law as a guide in cases 
where written laws expressly provided for its usage. In Kamanza s/o Chiwaya v. Manza w/o 
Tsuma,
17
the High Court held that the list of claims under section 2 of the Magistrate Court Act 
was exhaustive and therefore barred customary law claims based on tort or contract. Claims 
based on tort and contracts were not included in section 2 of the Magistrates Court Act. 
Most claims in which customary laws were used as a guide after 1967 fell within the 
ambit of section 3(2) of the Judicature Act and claims under section 2 of the Magistrates Court 
Act.  Firstly, most claims related to probate and administration matters.  For example, both in Re 
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 and Re Ogola Esates
19
 the respective testators drew wills that did not cater for their 
customary wives and the courts held that these wives were not wives for purposes of succession. 
However, the position of customary wives in succession was codified in section 3(5) of the Law 
of Succession Act.
20
 According to Section 3(5) of the Law of Succession Act, a woman married 
to a man under a system that allows polygamy is a wife for succession purposes under Sections 
26 and 40 of the Act despite the fact that the husband may have procured prior or subsequent 
monogamous marriage. Claims for succession brought after 1981 based on customary marriages 
such as polygamy have been successful due to the backing of section 3(5) of the Law of 
Succession Act. For example, in Irene Njeri Macharia v. Margaret Wairimu Njomo and 
Anor,
21
the Court of Appeal held that a wife married under customary law could claim through 
section 3(5) of the Law of Succession Act. 
Secondly, courts have applied customary laws in burial disputes. However, the 
application has been due to lack of a legal framework that deals with the dead body. The Law of 
Succession Act deals only with the estate of the deceased and not the dead body itself. In some 
circumstances, a testator may express the manner in which the dead body is to be disposed, 
although the personal representative is not bound to adhere to his wishes. In Pauline Ndete 
Kinyota Maingi v. Rael Kinyota Maingi,
22
the Court dismissed the provisions of a will of the 
deceased, which stated the manner of disposal of his body and applied Kamba customary law. 
The Court held that the wishes in the will could only be given effect to where the executor 
proved that the customary laws were repugnant to justice and morality. Despite this position, 
courts still allow a deceased testator to be buried according to his expressed intentions, further 
limiting the role of customary law in burial disputes. For instance, in Eunice Moraa Mabeche v. 
Grace Akinyi,
23
 the High court allowed the burial of the deceased in a Muslim cemetery 




Similarly, under common law, there is no property in a dead body. The use of customary 
law in burial disputes thus is only a last resort due to the absence of other laws dealing with the 
matter. This shows that customary law ranks the lowest in the hierarchy of legal norms, and 
courts only apply it where there is a legal lacuna. In Virginia Edith Wambui v. Joash Ochieng 
Ougo and Omolo Siranga,
25
 both the High Court and the Court of Appeal held that an African 
man could only be buried according to the customs of the community since he could not 
completely disassociate himself from the customs and practices of his tribe. The case involved a 
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dispute over the burial of S.M. Otieno‟s body after he died intestate. His wife wanted to bury him 
in his home at Ngong while his Umira Kager clansmen wanted to bury him at his ancestral home 
according to Luo customs. The High Court gave both parties the body and directed them to bury 
the deceased at his ancestral home. Some commentators have argued, (and the author concurs 
with them), that although the case was a triumph for African customary law, it failed to deal with 
the dichotomy between formal law and customary law but rather it reified this dichotomy. It is 
said the case was „…a missed opportunity for the court to demonstrate the potential of 
customary law as a relevant and dynamic force in the face of changing social circumstances.‟
26
 
4.2 Courts and the Repugnancy Clause 
Courts have applied Section 3(2) of the Judicature Act to declare African customary law 
as being repugnant to justice and morality. One challenge with the application of the repugnancy 
clause is that Kenyan law does not define it. As such, judges have had wide discretion in 
determining what is repugnant to justice and morality. Invariably, the judges have largely 
borrowed laws from other states to determine what actions are repugnant to justice and morality 
without taking heed to Lord Denning‟s decision in Nyali Limited v. Attorney-General,
27
 where he 
stated that common law may only be applied in foreign lands with modifications that fit local 
circumstances, since in foreign lands people have their own laws and customs that they respect.  
Courts have held most customary practices to be repugnant to justice and morality both in 
criminal and civil matters. In Katet Nchoe and Nalangu Sekut v. R,
28
 the High Court held that the 
Maasai custom of circumcising females was repugnant to justice and morality. The courts 
disregarded the customs and practices of the Maasai and adopted the definition of repugnancy to 
justice and morality under the Ghanaian Constitution that defines a repugnant custom as one that 
is harmful to both the social and physical well-being of a citizen. The Court held that since 
female genital mutilation caused pain, it was repugnant to justice and morality based on the 
Ghanaian definition. The decision seems rational and well-informed but a further analysis makes 
it fall at the seams. The decision is unjust to uncircumcised Maasai women who are shunned by 
their male because of being uncircumcised. It does not answer the question whether the courts 
will compel Maasai men to marry their uncircumcised women. Further, it does not address the 
circumcision of males, which is also a customary practice that causes pain. This decision shows 
that courts apply the repugnancy clause out of context, and in essence subvert the said customs 
and practices as inferior to customs and practices from elsewhere. 
 In Maria Gisege Angoi v.Macella Nyomenda,
29
 the court was faced with the question 
whether a woman-to-woman marriage custom among the Kisii was repugnant to justice and 
morality. A woman-to-woman marriage is a customary practice where a woman whose husband 
is dead “marries” another woman and chooses a male figure from her husband‟s clan to sire 
children for the dead husband. The High Court held that the practice was repugnant to justice and 
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morality since it prevented the other woman from freely choosing whom to marry. Thus, there 
was no marriage. The decision did not take into account the circumstances of the local 
communities and seems to interpret the repugnancy and morality of customs in a limiting 
manner. 
 
4.3 Proof of Customary Laws in Evidence 
The fact that customary law has to be proved in court illustrates the low place it occupies 
in the juridical order.  The Court of Appeal of Kenya has followed the Ghanaian case of Angu v. 
Attah
30
 in Atemo v. Imujaro
31
 that customary law has to be evidentially proved in court for it to 
be regarded as law. Similarly, in Ernest Kinyajui Kimani v. Muiru Gikanga and Another
32
, the 
court held that where customary law was not notorious or written; the party relying on it must 
prove it in court.  Compared to the Constitution, statutes, common law and equity, which the 
courts take judicial notice of, customary law has to be proved.  
The main reason why common law and equity are not proved in courts is that the courts 
assume they have attained public notoriety. Courts simply take judicial notice of these laws 
despite the fact that they are unwritten.  The public notoriety principle seems valid. Nonetheless, 
customary laws cannot attain public notoriety in the same way since most are rejected for being 
repugnant to justice and morality. Additionally, formal judges are taught the common law and 
principles of equity in their formal training and not customary law. Furthermore, customary law 
is specific to particular ethnic communities. African customary law is also not taught and when 
covered it is glanced at furtively to prove their repugnancy to morality and justice. This ensures 
that most African customary laws do not gain public notoriety to enable their frequent use in 
resolution of disputes.  
However, in cases where customary laws have become notorious, courts have taken 
judicial notice of those customs. In Wambugi w/o Gatimu v. Stephen Nyaga Kimani,
33
 the 
Kenyan Court of Appeal denied a married woman from inheriting her father‟s land on the ground 
that the Kikuyu custom that a married woman does not inherit her father‟s land was notorious 
and thus the court took judicial notice of that custom. It seems that the basis of this decision is 
grounded in Section 60 (1) (a) read together with section 60(1)(o) of the Evidence Act which 
give courts discretion to take judicial notice of all written and unwritten laws having the force of 
law in Kenya, and practices that have gained notoriety. 
The proof of customary laws has been through assessors in both civil and criminal 
matters. Section 87(1) of the Civil Procedure Act
34
 empowers the courts to use assessors in cases 
of disputes as to what the customs or laws of a caste, tribe, or community are. Likewise, up to 
2007, sections 263, 269,270, 271, 272, 297, 298, 299 and 322 of the Criminal Procedure Code
35
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provided for the use of assessors in trials at the High Court. These assessors helped the courts in 
resolving or settling disputes where customary laws are pleaded in criminal cases among other 
disputes. The institution of assessors in courts was a continuation from the colonial courts. In R 
v. Mohammed Iddi Omar,
36
 Ouko J explained the institution of assessors as that formed in 
colonial days to enable the European judges to understand the customs of local tribes when 
resolving cases and thus ensure that justice was contextualized to indigenous people. 
Although the institution of assessors was meant to administer justice in local context, 
laws and judicial opinions have continued to subjugate customary law. Under the provisions of 
the Criminal procedure code cited above paragraph, the judge was not bound to adhere by the 
opinion of assessors and they could dissent from the opinions with reasons. The existence of 
grounds such as repugnancy and justice, substantial justice, limitation to civil cases and 
subjection to other written laws provided fertile grounds for rejection of customary law. Ouko J, 
in the Mohammed Iddi Omar case summed the position of assessors as useless since most judges 
could overrule their opinions. The inferiority of the customs, laws and institutions of assessors 
stems from the colonial period when European Judges treated them as inferior and repugnant. 
For instance, Thacker J in R v. Ogende s/o Omungi
37
stated that he deplored the opinions of 
assessors because they were based on intertribal prejudice and resulted from pervasiveness and 
stupidity. 
 
5.0 Emerging Jurisprudence from our Courts post-2010 
Kenya promulgated a new constitution in 2010. Article 159 (2) (c) of the Constitution 
provides that courts are to be guided by the principles of traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Article 159(3) limits the application of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms 
by stating that they should not be used in a manner that contravenes the Bill of Rights, is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or other written laws or is repugnant to justice and morality or 
results in outcomes that are repugnant to justice and morality. 
Court decisions coming after the promulgation of the Constitution have applied 
customary law principles and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in criminal law.  Firstly, 
the oft-cited case of R v. Mohamed Abdow Mohamed
38
  applied traditional dispute resolution 
mechanism in resolving a murder case.  Abdow Mohamed was charged together with others not 
before the court for the murder of Osman Ali Abdi on 19 October 2011in Eastleigh, within the 
Starehe District of Nairobi. On the date of the trial, the prosecution made an application to court 
to mark the matter settled based on Islamic laws and customs.  The prosecution claimed that the 
accused‟s family had paid compensation to the deceased family in form of camels, goats, and 
performed rituals. The rituals were a form of blood money to the deceased‟s family. Further, the 
prosecution claimed that witnesses to the murder were not willing to testify and therefore they 
could not be able to proceed with the case.  The court upheld the application of the traditional 
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dispute resolution system based on Article 159 and Article 157 that allowed the Director of 
Public prosecution to withdraw cases with the leave of the court. This decision depicts the 
widening scope of TDRMs into the arena of criminal law, a position rarely held by courts in pre-
2010 jurisprudence on customary law. 
Secondly, apart from diverting cases from the criminal justice system by use of 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, an emerging jurisprudence from the court entails 
awarding compensation for offences based on customary law. Promoting traditional justice 
resolution mechanism would imply that courts adopt the decisions made by traditional dispute 
systems while in customary compensation; the court itself applies the customs of a community, 
clan or tribe in punishing those found guilty under the criminal justice system. Customary 
compensation may be based on section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code that allows for 
compensation of victims, although customary laws are not expressly provided for in the text of 
the Code. 
In R v. Lenaas Lenchura 
39
Emukule J sentenced Lenaas Lenchura using customary laws 
on conviction of manslaughter. Lenchura, a World War II veteran, stabbed the deceased, Lotiyan 
Lekapana, at a Lerata trading center after a dispute arose between the two on who would fetch 
water first. The deceased was 55 years while the accused was 89 years at the time of the fight 
and stabbing. After a plea bargain, the accused charge of murder was reduced to manslaughter 
and he pleaded guilty. As such, the only question that remained was on sentencing. The 
prosecution argued that the court should take into account the fact that the accused was a first 
offender and the circumstances under which he killed the deceased. The accused counsel 
submitted that water was a scarce resource in Samburu, a resource that carried the importance of 
life and death, and that the court should consider this. Due to the accused‟s advanced age and the 
inability of the government to provide water, a duty imposed on it by the Constitution, Emukule 
J resorted to the customary laws of the accused. He sentenced the accused to five years 
suspended sentence and required him to pay compensation of one female camel to the family of 
the deceased according to their customs.  
 6.0  Expected Jurisprudence to enhance Access to Justice using TDRMs 
Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (TDRM) entail the use of practices and 
customs of a community in resolving disputes. They form part of the cultural norms, values and 
traditions of a particular community. Thus, traditional disputes resolution mechanisms are firmly 
embedded on the customary laws of a tribe or ethnic group.  Consequently, the success of TDRM 
in enhancing access to justice is pegged on the role and recognition of customary laws as a 
significant source of law.
40
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Judicial decisions since the promulgation of the Constitution in 2010 have shown 
increased recognition of customary laws and TDRMs. The basis for the wide application of 
customary laws and TDRMs include Articles 2(4), 10, 11, 48, 67(2) (f), 159 (2) (c) and 159(3). 
Article 2(4) of the Constitution recognizes customary law as one of the applicable sources of law 
in Kenya. Under this provision customary law is required to be consistent with the Constitution 
only and not statute law. Article 10 (2) (b) outlines the national values and principles of 
governance that are to guide courts in interpreting the constitution or any law. These values and 
principles include inclusiveness, public participation, social justice, human rights and protection 
of the marginalized. Traditional justice systems can be promoted by courts to attain these values 
and principles. Courts are further enjoined to respect, uphold and defend the Constitution in 
Article 3(1). Article 48 mandates the state to promote access to justice for all people. In addition, 
Article 259 (1) (a) and (c) requires the Constitution to be interpreted in a manner that is 
purposive and leads to the development of the law.  Courts are therefore enjoined to promote and 
encourage the use of traditional justice mechanisms to enhance access to justice and in 
recognition of the culture and cultural expressions of the people. This is because in some parts of 
Kenya, there are no formal courts and TDRMs are the only means to access justice. Thus, the 
future jurisprudence will likely take into account the principles of TDRMs. 
Unlike Section 3(2) of the Judicature Act and Section 2 of the Magistrate Courts Act, 
Article 159 of the Constitution does not limit the application of TDRM principles to civil matters 
only.
41
 The courts have interpreted the Article widely to include application of TDRMs in 
criminal cases as was in R v. Mohamed Abdow Mohamed. This approach is reminiscent of the 
pre-1967 jurisprudence when the native tribunals and African Courts adjudicated upon 
customary crimes and wrongs. The emerging jurisprudence shows that TDRMs could be used in 
conjunction with the criminal code and the courts could encourage the use of traditional justice 
systems especially in cases where restorative justice and peace is what is of great concern to 
communities as opposed to retributive justice. However, it is highly unlikely that the prosecution 
will charge individuals with unwritten customary law, as was the position before 1967.  
Moreover, emerging judicial decisions show that unlike the period between 1967 and 2010 when 
customary laws were not applicable in criminal law, TDRMs after 2010 are amenable to criminal 
law. 
In land matters, Article 63 already designates community land to be land that is held on 
the basis of community of interests, ethnicity or culture. Article 67 (2) (f) of the Constitution 
requires the National Land Commission to encourage use of traditional dispute resolution in land 
disputes and conflicts. In addition to the Constitution and customary laws, other statutory 
frameworks enacted under the Constitution 2010 also provide for resolution of disputes through 
reconciliation and TDRMs. Section 18 (c) of the Environment and Land Court Act also entreats 
the court to apply the principles under Article 159 (2) of the Constitution in resolving disputes. 
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Similarly, Section 68 of the Marriage Act 2014 provides that parties married under customary 
laws may be required by a court to go through customary dispute resolution mechanisms in 
matters concerning dissolution of marriages before filing for divorce. In Lubaru M’Imanyara v. 
Daniel Murungi
42
 and Erastus Gitonga Mutuma v Mutia Kanuno & 3 Others
43
 the courts referred 
land marital disputes to Njuri Cheke for resolution based on Article 259(2) (c) of the 
Constitution. 
Similarly, Section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide for the use of 
compensation and reconciliation for settlement of crimes affecting the person such as assault 
provided they do not fall into the category of felonies.  Inasmuch as Emukule J did not refer to 
Section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the decision in R v. Lenaas Lenchura seems to fall 
under this category. The best basis for compensation is not in monetary terms but on customary 
practices of the affected persons. Application of customary compensation in criminal law under 
written laws revert to the pre-1967 period where customary compensation was widely used in 
lieu of sentencing for crimes under the Penal Code and other statutes. 
Despite the enhanced role of customary law and TDRMs under the Constitution, Statutes 
to be enacted
44
 and judicial opinions post-2010, history of the courts application of customary 
law may be an impediment to achieving justice under TDRMs.  An analysis of Sections 3(2) of 
the Judicature Act and Article 159(2) (c) and (3) reveals striking similarities that courts may 
cling onto to deny TDRM oxygen to survive. In the Judicature Act, customary law is only used 
as a guide while in the Constitution; the courts are to be guided by TDRM principles. Both laws 
do not require courts to apply customary laws or TDRMs but only entreats them to use them as a 
guide. The implication is that courts may refuse to apply either even in appropriate cases since 
they are only a guide. Consequently, the judicial officers hearing a certain matter have absolute 
discretion on their applications within the formal justice system. However, the Constitution 
seems to clarify on the juridical place of customary law by recognizing it. This may contribute to 
greater recognition and promotion of traditional justice systems by courts in enhancing access to 
justice. 
Nonetheless, Article 159 (3) (c) retains the hierarchical inferiority existing prior to 2010 
by introducing the repugnancy clause issue in relation to traditional justice mechanisms. By 
implication, traditional justice systems and customary law is still inferior to common law and 
principles of equity which the courts takes judicial notice of under Section 60 of the Evidence 
Act while customary law has to be proved in court. Additionally, Section 3 of the Judicature Act 
also ranks common law and principles of equity above customary laws and in effect TDRMs. 
The only time customary laws rank over common law is when they have been codified into 
statutes for instance polygamy under Section 3(5) of the Law of Succession Act.  A challenge 
then arises due to the unwritten and un-codified nature of customary law. Inadequate codification 
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of customary law principles into statutes ensures that customary laws and TDRMs remain at the 
bottom of the legal totem pole. 
Thirdly, Article 159 (3) (b) of the Constitution bars the application of TDRMs when they 
are repugnant to justice and morality.  The Constitution or statutes provide neither a definition 
nor what justice and morality entail. Further, courts have not interpreted justice and morality 
within the context of the challenged customs and TDRMS. Therefore, a judicial officer has 
leeway to determine what justice and morality is. More often than not, judicial officers use their 
own models of justice and morality or borrow from other areas and use them as standards to 
evaluate customary laws or TDRMs. The position ignores that different tribes, communities and 
ethnic groups have different customs. Using another custom to evaluate the justice and morality 
of an unrelated custom amounts to subjugation.  
 
7.0 Conclusion 
In conclusion, jurisprudence from the courts before 2010 show that they have treated 
African customary law as inferior to statutory laws in the juridical order of legal norms. The 
inferiority has emanated from colonial laws such as Section 3(2) of the Judicature Act and 
Section 2 of the Magistrate Courts Act that limits the list of claims under customary laws. The 
repugnancy clause has formed the basis for the disqualification and treatment of customary law 
as inferior. Additionally, the inferiority has been buttressed by the fact that customary law is un-
codified source of law and therefore must be proved in court. This jurisprudential history if 
unchecked may act as an impediment to the application of TDRMS and Articles 159(2) (c) and 
(3) of the Constitution since TDRMs and customary laws are closely interlinked and 
interconnected. There is therefore a need for a change of mindset and perceptions amongst 
judges, lawyers and the wider citizenry towards customary law if traditional justice systems are 
to contribute to enhanced access to justice for communities in Kenya. Courts must develop and 
generate appropriate and relevant customary law jurisprudence that will aid in the growth and 
promotion of traditional justice systems. 
 
